Although al Qaeda had already been severely weakened in Afghanistan and has recently focused more on surviving inside Pakistan than executing meaningful operations, the inability to capture or kill bin Laden meant that the U.S. mission itself had not been completed. With the death of bin Laden, a plausible, if not altogether accurate, political narrative in the United States can develop, claiming that the mission in Afghanistan has been accomplished.
How did I ever go a decade without noticing that killing or capturing bin Laden was the reason for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan? I had it so wrong! I thought there were a multitude of reasons, from bolstering the Bush presidency with some flashy machismo to removing Afghanistan's ability to be a terrorist shelter and training ground. But somehow it escaped my notice that killing one man offered any strategic significance beyond bolstering the morale of the American populace.
In a Whitehouse press conference Monday, U.S. Homeland Security Adviser John Brennan said of bin Laden’s death: "We are going to try to take advantage of this to demonstrate to people in the area that al Qaeda is a thing of the past, and we are hoping to bury the rest of al Qaeda along with Osama bin Laden." Exploiting bin Laden's killing is, of course, a good idea, but I don't see how one can extract strategic significance from what is, in essence, a symbolic act.
I was under the impression that al-Qa'eda had at least eight major theatres of operations and functioned of four operational levels, undercutting the importance of regional leadership. I thought they were not so much an organization as a decentralised network operating franchise-style in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Britain, and elsewhere, and the death of one man would do little to change that. I thought there was a reason that - almost from the start - papers from West Point to the International Institute of Strategic Studies likened the organization to a hydra.
In a lecture at Oxford University, Professor Bruce Hoffman outlined the four key operational levels as:
1. The elite cadre, often longstanding members of al-Qa'eda or similar organizations with combat experience
2. Affiliate groups, which may use their own names or be assimilated into al-Qaeda. They cooperate with the organization on a number of operational and strategic levels
3. Sleepers: Radicalized locals brought to Pakistan to receive training in explosives and the like. They receive training and are deployed home with open-ended operational instructions
4. The al-Qa'eda network: people unconnected with the organisation, but inspired by it, who carry out attacks they believe will further al-Qa'eda's (rather vague) aims. Some of these people are likely like the Shankill Butchers - thugs who simply use politics as an excuse for thuggishness. This network us useful to groups 1 and 2 for talent-spotting, monopolising the attention of law enforcement and intelligence, and of course, creating terror and the impression of vast power across a wide territory.
The organization is opportunistic, without a clear ideology or modus operandi, and it's pretty damn flexible. It's a hydra, but a lame, peaky hydra that's probably blinking confusedly in the Arab Spring. Privileging the contribution of one CIA mission insults everyone who has worked to bring down al-Qaeda or - from a U.S. perspective - to further America's goals in Afghanistan in less flashy but significantly more lasting and meaningful ways. And it insults everyone who has lured away members and potential members by creating ideas and movements more enticing and positive than the incoherent misanthropy of al-Qa'eda.
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